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Abstract
This paper investigates the claim that distant payoffs generate more risky choices
than immediate payoffs. Decision makers will make more risky choices if loss discount
rates are higher than gain discount rates or if the implicit risk of an option appears
greater for loss than gain outcomes. These hypotheses were tested by comparing the
loss and gain discount and implicit risk rates inferred from ratings of lotteries formed from
a 4x4x4x2 (gain, loss, time, probability) experimental design. The ratings were used to
estimate four alternative models of the lottery evaluation process. Implied loss discount
rates were higher than gain rates, but the difference diminished substantially once the
implicit risk rate had been extracted. Gain and loss implicit risk rates were also different
and in a direction that implies greater risk tolerance for decisions with delayed
consequences.
Conventional discounting models (e.g., the net present value model) imply
constant discount rates across gain and loss, as well as over time. A constant rate is
enforced when the conventional model is applied explicitly, but decision makers
discount for delay and for implicit risk whether or not a formal model is invoked. The
results of this study imply that decision makers' natural discounting processes do not
conform to conventional theory. The departures from conventional discounting detected
in this study can affect any intertemporal decision to which a formal model is not applied,
the options selected to submit for formal evaluation, and the estimates made of potential
outcomes and likelihoods for use in formal evaluations.
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1. Introduction
"The riskiness of racetrack wagers declines as post time approaches. . . .
Anxious public speakers are easier to sign up several months in advance than when the
date of the speech is close at hand" (Jones & Johnson, 1973, pp. 613-614). Women who
want to experience natural childbirth demand in advance that their doctors withhold pain
medication to preserve the memory of the birth, but at the onset of labor, they renege and
demand relief (Christensen-Szalanski, 1984; Schelling, 1984). Homeowners readily
assume home equity loans with immutable five-year "balloon" payments, but regret their
decision as the payment date draws near because, even though they expected the
payment and knew its magnitude, they apparently failed to appreciate its eventual impact
when they weighed it against the anticipated benefit.
These are anecdotal illustrations of what appears to be a discrepancy between
the way decision makers weight gains relative to losses for immediate versus future
outcomes. One explanation for the alleged asymmetry is a shift in the decision maker's
reference point that occurs as the outcome approaches. For example, before the onset
of labor, a woman's choice is between pain in the future, a negative but short-term
outcome, and the experience and memory of natural childbirth, presumably a positive
and long-term outcome. Once she is in labor, however, pain is the status quo - the
reference point - and she must choose between relief, an immediate short-term positive
outcome, and the experience of natural childbirth - two gains.
On the other hand, when risk is involved, the intertemporal difference in the
cost/benefit balance could be due to decision makers' perceptions of risk; decision
makers may exhibit an optimistic tendency to believe they can control the odds or the
magnitude of potential future loss (March & Shapira, 1987). This perception would
create a discrepancy between subjective discount rates for future negative and positive
outcomes. Losses, pain, payments, etc., may lose their disutility faster into the future
than gains of comparable magnitude lose their utility. A gain/loss discounting asymmetry
has been noted in previous intertemporal choice research, but previous studies have not
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usually addressed risk (Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989; Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1989b). The objective of this study is to estimate a descriptive model of an
intertemporal lottery evaluation process and use the resulting parameter estimates to
determine whether time preferences are influenced by asymmetric discounting when
subject reference points are constant.
In what follows, Section 2 gives some background information concerning
discounting theory and previous investigations of gain/loss asymmetry and implicit risk.
Section 3 introduces four simple descriptive models of the subjective evaluation process
for two-outcome risky decision options. The models' components are explained and
specific hypotheses relating to predicted values of the estimated model parameters are
discussed. Section 4 describes the experimental design and method of data analysis,
Section 5 presents the experimental results, and Section 6 discusses the results, their
implications, and directions for future research.
2. Background
2.1 Discounting
In general, an individual's "subjective rates of time preference are derived from his
consumption utility function . . . They are independent of the market rates of interest and
his borrowing and lending opportunities" (Henderson & Quandt, 1980, p. 327). Since
Fisher's (1930) formalization of discounted utility (DU), discount functions have usually
been assumed to depend only on time distance, given a particular discount rate. But
several departures from Fisher's model, including certain gain/loss asymmetries, appear
consistently in recent literature (Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Loewenstein &
Thaler, 1989; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1989a and 1989b; Shelley, 1990). Some of these
departures were identified by early theorists as causes of inconsistent intertemporal
choices and suboptimal planning (e.g., Strotz, 1955 and Thaler, 1981).
The departures from Fisher's DU theory noted in the literature tend to fall into the
four categories identified by Loewenstein & Prelec (1989a & 1989b) as: (1) A common
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difference effect - estimated discount rates fall as the length of delay increases; (2) an
absolute magnitude effect - estimated discount rates fall as the absolute magnitude of
the outcome increases; (3) delay/speed-up asymmetry, a framing effect involving a
reference point shift - estimated discount rates vary according to whether consumption is
delayed or expedited (e.g., for positive outcomes, the delay rate is greater than the
speed-up rate); (4) gain/loss asymmetry - the balance between gain and loss outcomes
is different for immediate versus future events.
Some inconsistencies in intertemporal decision making can be predicted by
identifying particular departures from the conventional discounting model. For example:
(1) If subjective discount rates vary inversely with time, decision makers will choose to
delay the onset of adversity, to begin a savings program next month or a diet next week
(Strotz, 1955; see also Thaler, 1981). If a decision maker's preferences among
restaurants for dinner tonight depend on where he ate last night or where he will eat
tomorrow, his discount rate depends on past or anticipated consumption and will not be
constant over time as DU theory predicts. A decision maker who discounts loss faster
than gain may prefer the lottery giving a fifty percent chance of gaining or losing $100 to
the lottery giving a fifty percent chance of gaining or losing $200 if payoffs are immediate,
but prefer the fifty percent chance of gaining or losing $200 if they are delayed for a year
or two. Here, again, the balance between gain and loss is apparently different for future
and immediate consequences. In this example, however, the two potential outcomes are
not likely to be redefined as they were in the childbirth example. Losses remain losses
and gains remain gains. Unfortunately, the decision maker who chooses the second
lottery due to discounting loss faster than gain will ultimately want to renege.
Gain/loss asymmetry can account for a tendency to choose more risky options
when outcomes are distant if the direction of the asymmetry implies faster discounting of
loss than gain. But most evidence indicating a gain/loss asymmetry reported thus far has
been generated in conjunction with the delay/speed-up asymmetry. The discrepancies
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noted appear to have been caused by an interaction between outcome sign (i.e.,
whether the outcome is a gain or loss) and the direction of proposed changes in
outcome timing (Thaler, 1981 ; Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley, 1990). The type of gain/loss
asymmetry addressed in this study is strictly an outcome sign effect.
2.2 Implicit Risk
Implicit future uncertainty refers to risk that is distinct from the risk associated with
lottery-type decision options. Risk attitudes for lotteries are reflected in the shape of the
decision maker's expected subjective value/utility function. The uncertainty addressed
by the implicit risk hypothesis exists in otherwise riskless, delayed decision options
because the future is, by its nature, uncertain. Bohm-Bawerk (1923) posited that people
charge a fee to compensate for the implicit risk in future events, a single proportional
charge that, when combined with the time preference reduction, gives the overall
discount on future goods. 1 He argued that this risk rate is independent of time
discounting and, hence, has no "causal connection with the phenomenon of interest" as
does the natural tendency to discount overtime (Bohm-Bawerk, 1923, p. 247; see also
Conard, 1963; Stevenson, 1986; Benzion et al., 1989).
The implicit risk hypothesis augments discounting theory by positing a premium
that reduces the absolute magnitude of future gain and loss amounts according to the
perceived uncertainty of future outcomes. If the perceived uncertainty is subjectively
greater for loss than gain amounts, the discount will be asymmetric with respect to
outcome sign and will cause the same effect as differential time discounting. Thus, a
gain/loss asymmetry related to implicit risk could account for an apparent increase in risk
tolerance for prospects with distant outcomes. Nothing in conventional theory predicts
asymmetric treatment of the future uncertainty of gain and loss outcomes.
1 An extension of the implicit risk hypothesis suggests that the premium is not a single one-time
charge, but rather a charge that increases with time distance. However, although the implicit nsk hypothesis
was supported in both Benzion et al. (1989) and Stevenson (1986), the multiple-period extension has not
been supported and is not addressed in this study (Benzion et al., 1989).
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Yet despite the symmetric treatment of positive and negative outcomes in DU and
expected utility theory, a large body of evidence exists that indicates decision makers
rarely treat gains and losses symmetrically, whether choices involve delayed outcomes
or not. For example, managers focus on the magnitude of possible negative outcomes to
define risk (i.e., a risky option is one that contains the threat of a severe hazard), and they
treat uncertainty about positive outcomes as an unimportant aspect of risk (March &
Shapira, 1987).
What is necessary to distinguish the effects of differential time discounting,
reference point shifts, implicit risk asymmetry, and inferred rate differences due to the
shape of the value or utility function is: (1) an experimental approach that controls
within-subject reference points, (2) a method of data analysis that can account for the
effect of slope differences between the negative and positive portions of the subjective
value function, and (3) a model that incorporates implicit risk.
2.3 Previous Empirical Studies
In a recent investigation of intertemporal choice, Loewenstein (1988) described
three question frames that can be used to investigate intertemporal choice: a neutral
frame, a delay frame, and a speed-up frame. Both the delay and speed-up frames
induce reference point shifts that appear to increase implied subjective discount rates for
positive outcomes relative to the rate produced using the neutral frame. Thaler (1981)
found that delayed receipts produce higher implied rates than delayed payments.
Benzion and colleagues (1989) found that both delayed receipts and expedited
payments produce higher implied rates than expedited receipts or delayed payments.
Although both Thaler and Benzion et al. conclude that receipts (positive outcomes)
generate higher discount rates than payments, it is not possible, using their data, to
separate the effect of outcome sign alone, from that of the reference point shift noted in
Loewenstein (1988). It is clear from their evidence that subjective loss combinations
(delayed gains and expedited losses) induce higher implied discount rates than
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subjective gain combinations (delayed losses and expedited gains), but it is not clear
that any discount rate asymmetries can be attributed to outcome sign alone (Shelley,
1990). This suggests that Loewenstein's concept of a neutral frame will be useful for
isolating the effect of outcome sign alone on discount rates (Shelley, 1990). Both Thaler
(1981) and Benzion et al. (1989) found that discount rates tend to vary inversely with
time distance and absolute outcome magnitude.
In the early 1970s, several direct tests were made of the proposition that people
choose more risky options when outcomes are delayed (Nisan, 1972; Jones & Johnson,
1973; Nisan & Minkowich, 1973). The results were mixed. Jones and Johnson (1973)
and Nisan (1972) found fairly strong evidence in favor of the proposition. Nisan and
Minkowich (1973) did not. The discrepancy in results appears to be associated with the
interaction between the chosen dependent measure and the time delays included in the
experiment. Subjective discount rates were not estimated in any of these early
investigations even though the prediction in two relied on a theory that posited faster
discounting of loss than gain outcomes (Miller, 1959).
3. Models and Hypotheses
3.1 Descriptive Models of Gain/Loss Asymmetry in Risky Intertemporal
Choice Evaluation
Time Discounting: There are a number of candidates for a descriptive model of
the intertemporal lottery evaluation process. If one or more of these models can explain
(in a statistical sense) explicit evaluations of a set of N lotteries with M systematically
varied payoff dates, then parameter estimates from fitting the model/s can be used to
infer discounting patterns under uncertainty and, hence, to substantiate the existence of
gain/loss asymmetry.
Let Rjj be a decision maker's response to a request for his evaluation of lottery i (i
= 1 , 2, . .
.
, N) at time j (j = 1 , 2, . . . , M). It is assumed that for choosing among lotteries,
knowing Ry is equivalent to knowing u(Ljj), the subjective value of the lottery, Ljj, offering
a pk chance of gaining gh and a (1- pk) chance of losing l|, at outcome date j; so Ljj =
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(gh. Pk. 'i; t = j) (with h x k x I = N). Rjj could be u(Uj) or it could be the subjective
equivalent value (SEV) of the lottery Ljj. Both expected utility theory and prospect theory
recognize the existence of some number, labeled a subjective equivalent value herein,
such that u(Ljj) = u(SEVjj). In expected utility theory this number is called the certain
equivalent value of the lottery. It can be expressed as a linear combination of the lottery
objective values as long as the lottery outcomes are appropriately weighted. For a risk
neutral individual, the SEV could be as simple a number as the expected value of the
lottery. On the other hand, it may happen that, in arriving at a lottery's SEV, decision
makers do not weight gain and loss the same or use probability decision weights that
conform to objective probability values. Letting S(l) and S(g) represent a decision
maker's evaluation of a lottery's gain and loss outcomes, 7i(p) his probability decision
weight, and 8|(t) and 5g (t) his loss and gain discount functions, respectively, one possible
representation of his lottery evaluation is:
Rij = u(Ljj) = SEVy = 5,(t)[1 - jc(p)]S(l) + 8g(t)ju(p)S(g) (1
)
Subjective probabilities are allowed to vary from objectively-stated values in the
estimation process to avoid distorting other parameter estimates. Implicit in this model is
the assumption that the decision maker is risk neutral. In fact, Model (1 ) shows u(SEV) =
SEV, so u(-) is the identity function. A linear subjective value function is an implicit
assumption in much of the intertemporal choice literature in which discount rates are
inferred; however, most of the studies that reflect this assumption have been conducted
under certainty when it is more likely to hold because the concavity/convexity implied by
risk aversion/risk seeking is not relevant. In Model (1), S(l) and S(g) are scaled
(weighted) versions of the objective gain and loss outcome values, but they are linear
functions of those values. If the linearity assumption fails and u(-) is (highly) nonlinear,
the model's fit will be inadequate and estimates of its parameters could be seriously
biased. When u(-) is allowed to be nonlinear (and otherwise different from the identity
function), the model becomes
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Rij = u(Ljj) = u(SEVij) = u[5,(t)[1 - jc(p)]S(l) + 8g(t)7c(p)S(g)]. (2)
If u(-) is a prospect theory value function, it typically is predicted to be S-shaped,
concave over gains, convex over losses, steeper for loss than gain outcomes, and gains
and losses are defined as positive or negative departures from some relevant reference
point. Expected utility theory suggests no particular shape. The subjective equivalent
values (SEVjj) remain linear functions of the lottery components, analogous to certain
equivalents. If u(-) were known, the parameters comprising the SEVjj values in Model
(2) would be no more difficult to estimate, using nonlinear regression, than those in
Model (1). Although u(-) is not known, it can be approximated at the same time the SEV
parameters are estimated. Approximating the shape of u() enhances the model fitting
process when the SEV model is the correct one. Hence, approximating u(-) can greatly
reduce the possibility of biased parameter estimates for SEVs (Anderson, 1982).
Conventional discounting supports the model
Rij = u[5(t)[1 - tc(p)]S(I) + 5(t)7r(p)S(g)], (3)
in which the gain and loss time parameters are constrained to be equal. Predicting a
gain/loss asymmetry associated with time discounting implies that the gain and loss time
parameters will not be equal; that is, 5|(t) * 5g (t) in Model (2). If gain/loss asymmetry is an
important aspect of a decision maker's evaluation, the fit of Model (3) should be
significantly inferior to that of Model (2).
Implicit Risk: The implicit risk hypothesis asserts that the future is sufficiently
uncertain that a one-time premium will be charged whenever an outcome is substantially
delayed. Nothing in the theory suggests a gain/loss asymmetry associated with the
premium. Neither the size, nor the occurrence, of future losses are predicted to be
significantly less certain than the size, or the occurrence, of future gains. Therefore, the
one-time discount rate for loss should be the same as the rate for gains. But according to
March and Shapira (1987), decision makers are inclined to be much less concerned with
the uncertainty associated with positive outcomes than with negative outcomes. If this
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attitude extends to the uncertainty inherent in the future, decision makers may ignore
implicit risk for gains, even though it is acknowledged for losses. Adding the implicit risk
element to Model (2) produces the following model:
Rij = uWp)5g(t){Tig K(t)]S(g)} + (1 - 7c(p))5i(t){TiiK(t)]S(l)}], (4)
where tig[£(t)] and Tll[£(t)] are the gain and loss implicit risk factors, respectively. The size
of the implicit risk premium has tended to depend on the absolute magnitude of the
outcome (Benzion et al. f 1989). This implies a ratio function represented in Model (4) as
rix(C(t)) = e-dxCW. The risk rate is dx (x = g, I); and £(t) = if t = 0, or £(t) = 1 if t > 0. In the
discrete case, nx(C(t)) = (1 + dx£(t))- 1 .
Table 1 summarizes the model forms and distinguishing assumptions:
Table 1: Model Summary
Model Symbolic Representation Distinguishing Assumptions
(1)
The Linear
Model
Rjj = u(Ljj) = SEVjj
= 5|(t)[1-7t(p)]S(l)+5g(tMp)S(g)
The utility/value function is linear and
discount rates are allowed to vary
across gain and loss outcomes. The
model assumes there is no implicit
risk premium.
(2)
The Full Model
Rij = u(Ljj) = u(SEVjj)
-u[5|(t)[1-«(p)]S(l)+5g(t)7c(p)S(g)]
The utility/value function may be
nonlinear and discount rates are
allowed to vary across gain and loss
outcomes. The model assumes
there is no implicit risk premium.
(3)
The Restricted
Model
Rij = u(Ljj) = u(SEVjj)
u[6(t)[1-7c(p)]S(l) + 5(t)ic(p)S(g)]
The utility/value function may be
nonlinear; discount rates are not
allowed to vary across gain and loss
outcomes. The model assumes
there is no implicit risk premium.
(4)
The Implicit
Risk Model
Rij = u(Ljj) = u(SEVjj)
u[«(P)«g(t){Tlg[C(t)]S(g)} + (1 - «(p))S|(t){TiiK(t)]S(l)}]
The utility/value function may be
nonlinear; discount rates are allowed
to vary across gain and loss
outcomes. The model allows for an
implicit risk premium.
3.2 Hypotheses
Model (1) will be estimated and its fit compared with that of Model (2) to establish
whether value functions are sufficiently nonlinear to distort discount rate estimates if
nonlinearities are ignored. The distinctions among Models (2) through (4) were
introduced to test the following hypotheses:
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Gain/loss asymmetry for discount rates: Any important gain/loss
asymmetry, associated with time discounting, will be detected by comparing the fit of
Model (2) with that of Model (3), using an F statistic (Gallant, 1987). If there is gain/loss
asymmetry, the fit of (3) will be inferior to that of (2). Conventional discounting theory
predicts no difference. If there is a time-discounting gain/loss asymmetry for risky
options, the prediction that risk tolerance increases with delay suggests that the direction
of the asymmetry favors faster discounting of loss than gain outcomes (5|(t) < 8g (t), in
Models (2) and (4), or letting 5i(t) = e"st and 5g (t) = e- rt , s > r.
Implicit risk asymmetry: If the implicit risk hypothesis holds for delayed lottery
payoffs, dg and d| will both be greater than zero. If there is no gain/loss asymmetry
associated with implicit risk, dg = d|, but if decision makers ignore the future uncertainty
associated with gain outcomes, dg will be zero; hence, d g < d|, implying a gain/loss
asymmetry for implicit risk. Model (4) separates the rate associated with implicit risk from
that associated with time discounting. If significant differences were found between the
time discount rates for gains and losses in Model (2), those differences will remain
significant, after the implicit risk rate is extracted, if the length of payoff delay accounts for
a substantial proportion of the predicted increase in risk tolerance associated with
delayed consequences. Incidentally, estimated discount rates are expected to diminish
with time as they have in previous studies (Thaler, 1981 ; Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley,
1990), so rt >rt+ i (st >st+i).
4. Experimental Method
4.1 Subjects
Thirty student subjects, from M.B.A. classes at the Graduate School of Business,
The University of Texas at Austin, took part in the study. Subjects were paid $1 for each
of two experimental sessions and were allowed to invest in a scaled version of one of the
rated options as an incentive to rate honestly. The average subject payment was $25.33
Gain/Loss Asymmetry in Risky Intertemporal Choice 1
2
for the two sessions; 26 of 30 subjects chose to participate in at least one incentive-
scheme investment.
4.2 Design
Models (1) through (4) imply that, given objective values for payoffs, probabilities,
and time, decision makers will transform the objective probability, time, and payoff values
to subjective values and combine that information both multiplicatively and additively
(across domains). A fully-crossed factorial design is nearly a requirement for testing the
validity of such models (Anderson, 1982). For this study, a total of 128 prospect stimuli
were formed by combining the levels 0fa4x4x4x2 design. There were four gain
($1 ,000; $500; $1 00; $60), four loss (-$900, -$400, -$200, -$1 60), four time (immediate,
six months, one year, and two years), and two probability (.6, and .4) levels. A totai of 32
lotteries were formed at each of 4 outcome times. Gain and loss amounts were selected
because they represent a range of values likely to be meaningful to the graduate student
subjects. The experimental stimuli were presented in a neutral frame (i.e., no change in
the expected outcome timing was proposed; see Loewenstein, 1988 and Shelley, 1990),
and care was taken to insure a stable within-subject reference point on the scale.
Because each rated option contained both the gain and loss aspects of interest,
reference points were also stable across gain and loss outcomes.
4.3 Training and Task.
The first 30 to 45 minutes of the first experimental session were used to read and
sign a participation contract, instruct each subject in the use of the rating scale, and
demonstrate the incentive scheme. Once subjects were comfortable with their use of the
rating scale, a spiral-bound practice booklet was used to demonstrate the experimental
incentive scheme and to insure that subjects understood the task and its relation to the
incentive scheme. Subjects were allowed to make changes in their use of the scale
following the practice session.
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Figure 1 is a sample stimulus from an experimental booklet. Both accounting gain
and loss and cash flow information are provided. Subjects had previously identified the
worst and best options in the set and written the relevant information about them on a
reference rating scale. Because investment cost was the same across all options, it
should have been cancelled in the editing phase of the subjective evaluation stage so
that options were evaluated based on their outcome magnitudes, probability levels, and
outcome times (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
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This investment option offers you a
six in ten chance of gaining $1 ,000
and a four in ten chance of losing $900.
Whether you lose or win, final payments will be
made immediately. The cost of the investment is
$100.
Cash flow : The $100 cost is paid immediately.
If the outcome is:
1
.
A gain - Your investment cost is returned and
you receive an additional $1,000 immediately.
2. A loss - Your investment cost is not returned
and you pay an additional $800 immediately.
RATING SCALE
The Worst
Investment
The Best
Investment
Figure 1
Sample Stimulus
In the proposed descriptive models subjects' responses, the evaluative ratings, Rjj,
are assumed to result from (1) transforming (or scaling) the objective values of the
independent variables to subjective values and (2) combining the subjective values in a
particular way. Because subjects' direct magnitude estimates of the values u(Ljj) tend to
be biased and do not give a reliable scale (Anderson, 1982), subjects were asked to rate
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the relative attractiveness of the lotteries on a graphic rating scale rather than estimate
the values u(Ljj). The observed ratings, Rjj, were assumed to be strategically equivalent
to the values u(Ljj).
The experiment was run with one subject at a time. Subjects were asked to rate all
128 prospects in each of two separate sessions set one day apart. Subjects were
allowed to make computations in their experimental booklets. Obtaining responses from
two sessions mitigated random inconsistencies and possible order effects. It also
enabled a measure of pure error for testing model fit (Draper & Smith, 1 981 ). Prospect
orderings were random within the experimental booklets and a different random ordering
was used for each session. Each experimental session took one hour to complete, on
average.
4.5 Analysis
Model (1) implies that lottery ratings are continuous, monotone linear functions of
experimental objective values. If linearity is assumed in error, (1) ANOVA tests of the
appropriateness of the SEV model will be misleading, (2) tests of the model's lack of fit
will be significant, and (3) parameter estimates may be seriously biased. The parameter
estimates from fitting Models (2) through (4) reflect each subject's actual value function
because their value functions were approximated as parameters were estimated (using
integrated, second-order, normalized B-splines; deBoor, 1978; Winsberg & Ramsay,
1981; Schumaker, 1981; Stevenson, 1986). All models were fit using Marquardt's
compromise procedure as the nonlinear regression algorithm; outcome magnitudes
were constrained to fall between 10 (for the $1000 outcome) and -9 (for the -$900
outcome); and the immediate time parameter was fixed at one (e.g., 5(t) = e _r1 = 1 at t = 0).
To test the time parameter predictions specified in the previous section, gain and loss
time parameters were estimated for each subject and each model. Implied rates were
computed using the continuous compounding formula, 5g(t) = e'" (o|(t) = e"^).
Parameter estimates were compared across the linear and approximation models; the fit
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for each model was tested for each subject, and the fit of the restricted Model (3) was
compared with the fit of the full Model (2).
5. Results
5.1 Tests of Scale Use and Model Fit.
Scale Use: If the rating scale (see Figure 1) was used correctly, dependent
measures can be interpreted as continuous, monotone increasing functions of the
subjective equivalent values of the lotteries. To check that all 30 subjects used the scale
in the same way, a factor analysis was conducted using subjects as variables and mean
(across sessions) ratings as observations (128 observations on 30 variables). If all
subjects used the rating scale in the same way, they should all load significantly on a
single factor. All subjects did, in fact, load significantly on one factor. The factor loadings
ranged from a low of 0.725 to a high of 0.976. The mean factor loading was 0.91
.
Subjects appear to have used the rating scale appropriately and the data of every
subject who completed the experiment were used in the model fitting process.
Model Fit: A plot of observed ratings against expected values for the 32
immediate and 32 two-year lotteries is shown in Figure 2 for Subject 8. A line for each
outcome time indicates where ratings would fall if they were linear functions of expected
values. Subject 8's value function appears to be approximately S-shaped in this plot.
Value functions for 24 of 30 subjects revealed striking nonlinearities on visual inspection.
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6.
5.
4h
Ratings
24
I.
Subject 8
Two-year Payoffs
# Immediate Ratings
O Two-year Ratings
-600 -400 600
Expected Value
Figure 2
S-shaped Value Function
The results of an ANOVA (Table 2) indicate that, if a linear value function is
assumed (Model (1)), the data do not support the proposed SEV model. Alternatively, if
the SEV model is correct, the data do not support a linear value function. This alternative
is consistent with the visual inspection of plots of raw ratings against expected values
(e.g., Figure 2). All the proposed models imply that in arriving at an SEV value, (1)
probability, time, and subjective gain and (2) probability, time and subjective loss
combine multiplicatively, but (3) the loss and gain components are combined additively.
If these assumptions hold, enough levels of the explanatory variables (factors) are
effective, and u(-) is linear, a repeated measures ANOVA using the implicit values,
u(Lq), q = N x M, as dependent measures would reveal significant two-factor interactions
for every combination of two factors, except gain and loss because gain and loss are
summed to arrive at u(Lq). There should also be reliable three-factor interactions, except
for combinations that include both gain and loss. The four-factor interaction would not be
significant. However, even if the SEV model (SEVjj = 5|(t)[1 - rc(p)]S(l) + 8g (t)7c(p)S(g)) is
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Table 2
Univariate ANOVA Results
Dependent Measures = Rating Values (R)
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Source df F Prob > F
Prob x Time 3 4.49 0.0056
Prob x Gain 3 46.80 0.0001
Prob x Loss 3 8.59 0.0001
Time x Gain 9 2.86 0.0031
Time x Loss 9 3.06 0.0017
Gain x Loss 9 32.53 0.0001
Prob x Time x Gain 9 1.17 0.3133
Prob x Time x Loss 9 1.03 0.4126
Prob x Gain x Loss 9 3.37 0.0006
Time x Gain x Loss 27 2.57 0.0001
Prob x Time x Gain x Loss 27 1.99 0.0021
adequate and the factor levels are effective, u(-) could be nonlinear. If u(-) is highly
nonlinear, interactions are less predictable. Some expected interactions may fail to
reach significance and some interactions may appear across the additive components of
the model.
As Table 2 indicates, the predicted two-way interactions are significant, but there
is also a strong two-way interaction between gain and loss. The three-way prob x gain x
loss and time x gain x loss interactions are also significant. No other three-factor
interaction is significant. Because nonlinearities were obvious for many subjects, the
invalid assumption implied by the ANOVA results above (Table 1) is taken to be
inappropriately assuming a linear value function rather than inappropriately specifying
the SEV model. Tests for lack of fit for Model (1 ) were significant for all but four subjects.
Because the evidence favors nonlinear value functions, each subject's value
function was approximated in fitting Models (2) through (4). With the spline
approximation, Models (2) and (4) produced an adequate fit for 27 of 30 subjects.
Statistics for lack of fit and the percent of explainable variation explained are shown in
the Appendix for Model (2). The approximated value functions fell generally into three
categories: (1) linear (6 subjects), (2) S-shaped (10 subjects), and (3) convex (14
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subjects). Figure 3 shows a convex function that resembles the loss portion of a
prospect theory value function. Figures 4 and 5 show linear and S-shaped value
functions, respectively.
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Approximated Convex Value Function
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5.2 Hypothesis Tests
Table 3 - Model (1): Linear Value Functions
Mean Discount Rates by
Outcome Sign and Delay Length
Domain: Est. Mean
Discount
Time Rate Std. Dev. Std. Error Variance
Gain:
Six Months 0.117 0.072 0.013 0.005
One Year 0.060 0.036 0.001 0.007
Two Years 0.032 0.026 0.001 0.005
Loss:
Six Months 0.277 0.241 0.044 0.058
One Year 0.207 0.391 0.071 0.153
Two Years 0.075 0.053 0.009 0.003
Mean discount rate estimates (across subjects), standard deviations, standard
errors and variances for each outcome sign and delay combination are shown in Tables
3 and 4 for Models (1), (2), and (4). Rate estimate differences between Model (1) and
Models (2) and (4) are greater for loss than gain payoffs, and the standard errors of the
rate estimates from Model (1) are biased downward making the null hypotheses too easy
to reject.
As shown in Table 4, mean gain discount rate estimates are about the same
whether an implicit risk rate is extracted or not, but mean loss discount rate estimates are
reduced substantially when the implicit risk rate is extracted. Loss rate estimates,
compared across the implied-risk and no-implied-risk models ((4) and (2), respectively),
are significantly different for all three delay lengths (p = 0.0236 for six months, p = 0.0239
for one year, and p = 0.0321 for two years), but gain rates are not significantly different
across the two models.
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Table 4 - Approximated Value Functions
Mean Discount Rates by
Outcome Domain and Delay Length
Domain: Est. Mean
Discount
Time Rate Std. Dev. Std. Error Variance
Gain:
Six Months
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.109 0.169 0.026 0.020
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.108 0.144 0.027 0.021
One Year
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.060 0.078 0.014 0.006
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.057 0.048 0.009 0.002
Two Years
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.039 0.047 0.009 0.002
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.040 0.032 0.006 0.001
Loss:
Six Months
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.223 0.313 0.057 0.098
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.149 0.203 0.037 0.041
One Year
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.114 0.168 0.031 0.028
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.074 0.097 0.018 0.009
Two Years
No Risk Rate Extracted (2) 0.073 0.082 0.015 0.007
Risk Rate Extracted (4) 0.056 0.053 0.010 0.003
Tests for a difference in fit between the restricted and full models (Models (3) and
(2), respectively) indicate that the restricted model's fit is significantly inferior (p < .10) to
that of the full model for 12 of 30 subjects, so some gain/loss asymmetry is present in the
discounting process. In fact, seven subjects discounted loss faster than gain in general,
one subject discounted gain faster than loss, and four subjects discounted
asymmetrically only in one period. For example, Subject 30 stated in her exit interview
that she had a particular aversion to any loss that might occur approximately one year in
the future, and, in fact, Subject 30's ratings implied an extremely high negative discount
rate for losses delayed one-year.
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The 30 gain and 30 loss discount rate estimates for each delay length allowed
three paired comparison t-tests of the null hypothesis rt = st against the alternative rt < st-
Time parameter estimates from both Models (2) and (4) were used to test whether, on
average, loss or gain discount rates are higher. The results are shown in Table 5. When
no risk rate is extracted, gain and loss discount rates differ significantly for each delay
length indicating a gain/loss asymmetry. The direction of the difference supports the
prediction that choices will be more risky when outcomes are distant.
Table 5
Hypothesis Test Results:
Loss Discount Rates Are Higher Than Gain Rates
Test: Mean Paired Prob > t
D fference df t-value One-tail
rt < s t
Six Months
No Risk Rate Extracted -0.113 29 -2.820 0.0043
Risk Rate Extracted -0.041 29 -1.649 0.0550
One Year
No Risk Rate Extracted -0.054 29 -1.990 0.0281
Risk Rate Extracted -0.017 29 -0.989 0.1655
Two Years
No Risk Rate Extracted -0.034 29 -2.373 0.0123
Risk Rate Extracted -0.016 29 -1.908 0.0332
With the implicit risk rate extracted, the gain and loss discount rates for the one-
year delay are no longer significantly different. However, the pattern that remains tends
to support a gain/loss asymmetry with losses discounted faster than gains. The discount
rates shown in Table 4 indicate that the implicit risk hypothesis may hold for possible
future losses because loss discount rates change significantly when the implicit risk rate
is extracted; gain rates appear virtually unaffected. Tests of the prediction that both the
gain and loss risk rates are greater than zero are consistent with this observation. Only
the implicit risk rate for losses is significantly greater than zero (p = 0.01 52). It appears
that the uncertainty inherent in the future is acknowledged for loss outcomes, but not for
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gain outcomes. It follows that the loss risk rate is significantly greater than the gain rate
(p = 0.0146).
The independence assumption reflected in the conventional discounting model
implies constant-rate discounting overtime, but previous evidence (Thaler, 1981;
Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley, 1990) suggests that discount rates tend to decline with
delay length. This has been labeled the "common difference effect" (Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1989a) and has been identified as one cause of dynamic intertemporal
inconsistency (Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981). Some of the apparent decline may be
caused by rate estimates that include both the one-time risk rate and the time preference
rate. Table 6 shows test results for the null hypothesis that subjective discount rates do
not vary with delay length.
Table 6
Hypothesis Test Results:
Discount Rates Diminish Over Time
Test: Mean Paired Prob > t
D fference df t-value One-tail
r
t
- rt + 1 >
t = Six Months
No Risk Rate Extracted 0.049 29 2.046 0.0249
Risk Rate Extracted 0.051 29 2.105 0.0220
t = One Year
No Risk Rate Extracted 0.022 29 2.290 0.0148
Risk Rate Extracted 0.017 29 1.966 0.0295
st - st + 1 >
t = Six Months
No Risk Rate Extracted 0.109 29 2.268 0.0155
Risk Rate Extracted 0.076 29 1.673 0.0526
t One Year
No Risk Rate Extracted 0.041 29 2.017 0.0265
Risk Rate Extracted 0.018 29 1.308 0.1006
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As in previous investigations, the evidence suggests that subjective discount rates
vary inversely with the length of delay; however, the decline in loss rates is not significant
once the implicit risk rate has been extracted. Figures 6 and 7 are graphic illustrations of
the decline in rates overtime for the no-implicit-risk and implicit-risk fits (Models (2) and
(4)), respectively. In Figure 6 gain and loss discount rates appear to be converging, but
Figure 7 shows that once the implicit risk rate has been extracted, gain and loss rates
appear on visual inspection to decline at about the same pace.
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Gain and Loss Discount Rate Decline
Over Time: No Implicit Risk Rate Extracted
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Gain and Loss Discount Rate Decline
Over Time: Implicit Risk Model
Hypothesis test results support the presence of gain/loss asymmetries for both
time discounting and implicit risk for the lottery evaluation task. Parameter estimates
from Model (4) imply that losses are discounted more than gains for both time and
implicit risk, so either, or both, discounts will explain an increase in risk tolerance for
lotteries with delayed payoffs. The consistently poor fit of Model (1) indicates that
ignoring possible nonlinearities in value/utility functions may distort inferred discount
rates; standard errors imply greater precision than is warranted. Also, consistent with
previous research on intertemporal choice, implied discount rates were found to vary
inversely with the length of the payoff delay.
6. Discussion and Suggestions for Future Research
The conventional approach to discounting implies complete intertemporal
independence and reliance on market interest rates. What that implies in terms of
intertemporal preferences is that no preference learning takes place. For example, our
current and previous avenues of entertainment will have no bearing on our preferences
for entertainment in the future. If these assumptions are valid, discount rates should not
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differ over time or across outcome sign within a given decision option. Gain/loss
asymmetry, on the other hand, predicts that negative and positive outcomes are likely to
be treated differently over time. If gains are discounted faster, the riskiest choices we
make may be the ones for which the consequences must be faced immediately. But if
losses are discounted faster, then, indeed, "the riskiness of racetrack wagers [will
decline] as post time approaches" (Jones & Johnson, 1973, p. 613).
The discount rates inferred in this study support the claim that, on average, the
perceived severity of loss declines faster with delay than the perceived benefit of gain.
This means that many decision makers who are risk averse in the short run will appear
more risk tolerant for delayed outcomes. Previous research has shown that risk
preferences are variable because they depend on context and decision frame, as well as
on innate personality factors (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981 ; Lopes, 1987; March &
Shapira, 1987). "[M]anagers", for example, "are inclined to show greater propensity
toward risk taking when questions are framed as business decisions than when they are
framed as personal decisions" (March & Shapira, 1987, p. 1409), and managers who
define success or failure in terms of a particular target level of return may be relatively
more (less) risk tolerant if their current position is below (above) the target (Lopes, 1987;
March & Shapira, 1987). It now appears that payoff timing is a dimension of context that
influences risk preferences.
March and Shapira (1987) note that managers do not define risk in terms of
variance, nor attractiveness in terms of expected value; instead, many focus on the
magnitude of potential loss to determine risk. Time discounting alone implies that the
perceived magnitude of outcomes diminishes with temporal distance. The rates inferred
in this study indicate that the perceived magnitude of loss diminishes faster than that of
gain. This asymmetry implies that the tradeoff between the potential gain and loss
components of a decision option will not be the same for distant as for immediate payoff
times because gain will receive relatively more weight when payoffs are distant.
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Similarly, estimated implicit risk rates imply that the perceived ability, willingness, or
necessity, of paying future losses is treated as less certain than the ability to collect a
future gain, at least for the present study. The subjective loss risk rates in Benzion et al.
(1989) were also higher, so in both the present and the Benzion et al. studies, subjective
losses were perceived as less certain (see Shelley, 1990, for an explanation of
subjective loss in this setting). The question that emerges is: Why would decision
makers discount future loss magn itudes more than gain magnitudes?
March & Shapira (1987) suggest an explanation indirectly. They note that there
are "three pervasive features of managerial treatment of risk that deviate from simple
conceptions of risk and are important for understanding managerial decision making"
(March & Shapira, 1987, p. 1411). First, managerial risk conceptions are insensitive to
probability estimates. "[I]t appears to be the magnitude of the value of the outcome that
defines risk for managers, rather than some weighting of that magnitude by its likelihood"
(March & Shapira, 1987, p. 141 1). 2 Second, risk propensity tends to vary with the focus
of the decision maker's attention, and attention varies with context (Mischel & Ebbesen,
1970; Mischel, Grusec, & Masters, 1969; Lopes, 1987; March & Shapira, 1987). For
example, "[a]s a result of changing fortunes or aspirations, focus is shifted away from the
dangers involved in a particular alternative and toward its opportunities" (March &
Shapira, 1987, p. 1412; Lopes, 1987). Changes in fortunes or aspirations influence
subjective values, but change takes time and aspirations are embedded in the future.
Delay provides an opportunity to pursue aspirations and to control outcomes. Third,
managers believe they can control the odds (i.e., change the odds; March & Shapira,
1987, p. 1414). It follows that managers may believe they can also control the
magnitude of the downside risk, given time. In fact, in many cases judicious choices and
well-placed effort will mitigate potential negative outcomes. As a consequence,
2 ln fact, the best-fitting SEV model for 1 6 of the 30 subjects was one that did not scale outcome
magnitudes with probabilities. Eleven of 30 subjects gave much more weight to loss than to gain outcomes.
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managers may discount the nagnitude of loss more because they believe (1) its
likelihood is les certain, and (2) its magnitude can be changed overtime.
Although the results obtained in this study indicate a tendency to discount losses
and gains differently, on average, generalizations of this tendency to particular decision
makers or decision situations should be made with caution. Risk propensity is known to
vary with context. Time preferences may as well. In fact, both Fisher (1930) and Bohm-
Bawerk (1923) predict they will. The experimental stimuli used in this study were
relatively abstract. Richer contextual detail may exacerbate or mitigate the effect
uncovered. For example, outcomes were all monetary in the present study; negative
outcomes may be discounted quite differently when they are measured in terms of
deaths, disease frequencies, or environmental decay, or when they are relatively fleeting
as are electric shocks or routine business trips. Future research might be directed
toward determining the effect of specific decision contexts or toward identifying the extent
to which control of the odds and control of outcome magnitudes influence perceptions of
risk for decisions with delayed consequences.
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Subject % of Explainable df F to test
(Deleted Variation Lack of Fit/ Lack of
Observation) Explained Pure Error Fit Prob > F
1
(17)
96.92 109/128
(108/127)
1.4056
(1.2465)
0.0320
(0.1160)
2 97.69 109/128 1.1316 0.2498
3 95.69 109/128 0.9397 0.6299
4 93.43 108/128 0.9150 0.6822
5
(26)
97.65 108/128
(107/127)
1.3430
(1.9974)*
0.0546
(0.0001)
6 98.08 109/128 0.8795 0.7545
7
(101)
98.35 108/128
(107/127)
1.4242
(0.9237)
0.0275
(0.6631)
8 96.74 108/128 0.9609 0.5832
9
(73)
94.50 108/128
(109/127)
1.2700
(1.1488)
0.0970
(0.2250)
10
(100)
97.83 108/128
(107/127)
2.7860
(1.0022)
0.0000
(0.4932)
11 97.19 109/128' 0.9683 0.5673
12 94.73 109/128 1.8003* 0.0007
13 96.22 108/128 0.9271 0.6565
14 83.69 108/128 1.0050 0.4872
15 92.61 108/128 0.5101 0.9998
'Significant at a = 0.10.
Table 1A
Tests for Lack of Model Fit: Full Approximation Model
Subjects 1 through 15
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Subject % of Explainable df F to test
(Deleted Variation Lack of Fit/ Lack of
Observation) Ex Din ined Pure Error Fit Prob > F
16 94.96 108/128 0.7365 0.9491
17 96.38 109/128 1.1170 0.2727
18 93.46 109/128 0.7615 0.9282
19
(112)
93.85 108/128
(107/127)
1.2840
(1.1324)
0.0872
(0.2336)
20 95.76 108/128 0.9514 0.6040
21
(98)
92.08 108/128
(107/127)
1.2900
(1.1434)
0.0833
(0.2494)
22 97.79 108/128 0.7255 0.9569
23 93.94 108/128 1.0590 0.3764
24 96.55 109/128 0.7626 0.9271
25 91.28 108/128 0.7427 0.9443
26 93.33 108/128 1.2517 0.1112
27
(47)
98.39 108/128
(107/127)
1.3240
(1.2378)
0.0637
(0.1241)
28 56.11 108/128 1.1350 0.2451
29 91.57 109/128 1.5800* 0.0065
30 °° 1 6 108/128 0.8017 0.8817
'Significant at a = 0.-0.
Table 2A
Tests for Lack of Mode! Fit: Full Approximation Model
Subjects 16 through 30
Gain/Loss Asymmetry in Risky Intertemporal Choice 31
References
Anderson, N. H. (1982). Foundations of information integration theory . New York:
Academic Press.
.
(1982). Methods of information integration theory . New York:
Academic Press.
Benzion, U., Rapoport A., & Yagii, J. (1989). Discount rates inferred from decisions: An
experimental study. Management Science . 35(3), pp. 270-284.
Birnbaum, M. H. (1978). Differences and ratios in psychological measurement. In J.
Castellan & F. Restle (Eds.). Cognitive theory. Vol. 3) . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bohm-Bawerk, E. V. (1923). The positive theory of capital . (W. Smart, Trans.). New
York: G. E. Stechert. (Original work published in 1888).
Buseymeyer, J. R. (1980). Importance of measurement theory, error theory, and
experimental design for testing the significance of interactions. Psychological
Bulletin . 88, pp. 237-244.
Conard, J. W. (1963). An introduction to the theory of interest . Berkeley: University of
California Press.
deBoor, C. (1978). A practical guide to splines . New York: Springer-Verlag.
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of value . New Haven: Yale University Press.
Draper, N. R., & Smith, H. (1981). A pplied regression analysis . (2nd ed.). New York:
Wiley.
Fisher, I. (1930). The theory of interest . New York: Macmillan.
Gallant, A. R. (1987). Nonlinear Statistical Models . New York: Wiley & Sons.
Henderson, J. M., & Quandt, R. E. (1980). Microeconomic theory: A mathematical
approach . (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Jones, E. E., & Johnson, C. A. (1973). Delay of consequences and the riskiness of
decisions. Journal of Personality
.
41
, pp. 613-637.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometnca
.
47(2). pp. 263-291.
Loewenstein, G. F. (1988). Frames of mind in intertemporal choice. Management
Science
. 34(2), pp. 200-214.
,
and Prelec, D. (1989a) Decision making overtime and under
uncertainty: a common approach. Unpublished working paper. Center for
Decision Research, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Gain/Loss Asymmetry in Risky Intertemporal Choice 32
,
and Prelec, D. (1989b) Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence
and an interpretation. Unpublished working paper. Center for Decision
Research, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
,
and Thaler, R. (1989) Anomalies, intertemporal choice. Journal of
economic perspectives. 3(4) .
Lopes, L (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. Advances in
experimental social psycholog y. 20 . pp. 255-295.
March, J., and Shapira, Z. (1987). Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking.
Management Science
. 33(11). pp. 1404-1418.
Meyer, R. F. (1975). State-dependent time preference. In Proceedings of the workshop
on decision making with multiple conflicting objectives (pp. 232-244).
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
Miller, N. E. (1959) Liberalization of basic stimulus-response concepts: extension of
conflict behavior, motivation, and social learning. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A
study of science . 2. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Mischel, W., & Ebbesen, E. B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology . 16
. pp. 329-337.
,
Grusec, J., & Masters, J. C. (1 969). Effects of expected delay time on
the subjective value of rewards and punishments. Journal of Personality and
Socia! Psycholo gy, JJ_, pp. 363-373.
Nisan, M. (1972). Dimension of time in relation to choice behavior and achievement
orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 21 . pp. 175-182.
,
& Minkowich, A. (1973). The effect of expected temporal distance on
risk taking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 25 , pp. 375-380.
Schumaker, L. (1981). Spline functions: Basic theory . New York: Wiley
Shelley, M. K. (1990) Outcome signs, question frames, and discount rates.
Unpublished manuscript. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Stevenson, M. K. (1986). A discounting model for decisions with delayed positive or
negative outcomes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General . 1 15 (2). pp.
131-154.
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review
of Economic Studies
. 23, pp. 165-180.
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics
lette r? , 8, pp. 201-207.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981 ). The framing of decisions and the psychology of
choice. Science
.
21
1
. pp. 453-458.
Gain/Loss Asymmetry in Risky Intertemporal Choice 33
Winsberg, S., & Ramsay, J. O. (1 981 ). Analysis of pairwise preference data using
integrated B-splines. Psvchometrica . 46 , pp. 171-186.
<
I

